In 2010 the United States repealed Section 212(a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act which stated that a non-citizen determined to have a 'communicable disease of public health significance' is not admissible into the country without a waiver. This included HIV+ non-citizens. In the same year, several other countries including China and South Korea removed similar restrictions. This paper examines the global debate over HIV-related travel restrictions which has been ongoing since the mid-1980s and attempts to account for these recent policy changes. Entry restrictions have almost always been justified as necessary in two ways: to protect public health from the supposed threat posed by the entry of people living with HIV, and to limit the costs HIV+ migrants impose on domestic health systems. Opponents of these restrictions have consistently sought to challenge the evidence underpinning these claims and also to re-frame the issue in rights terms. However, in this paper I argue that this re-framing was not in itself sufficient to bring about policy change. Some other factors also have to be taken into account, including the changing political context (both domestic and international), and the network building strategies employed by opponents of the restrictions from 2008 onwards.
Introduction
The world should make war against AIDS, not against people with AIDS.
UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, 1 December 1998
We talk about reducing the stigma of this disease, yet we've treated a visitor living with it as a threat. If we want to be the global leader in combating HIV/AIDS, we need to act like it.
President Barrack Obama, 30 October 2009 For over 20 years United States immigration regulations stated that people living with HIV (PLWHIV) were inadmissible for entry into the country without being granted a waiver.
Having formally removed that restriction in 2010 -a year designated by UNAIDS as the 'year of equal freedom of movement for all' -the US has finally aligned itself with those countries which no longer (or in many cases never did) impose entry restrictions on PLWHIV. Other states -including Canada, South Korea and China -have also amended their immigration regulations to address this issue in the last few years. It may be too early to declare victory for those who have long opposed the imposition of such restrictions, but there is a palpable sense that the tide has at last begun to turn.
The debate around entry restrictions has been ongoing since the 1980s. States imposing them have generally justified them through the use of two frames. The first is public health security/public safety, with the argument being made that allowing PLWHIV to enter the country exposes the domestic population to a public health risk. The second common framing of restrictions is an economic one: that allowing PLWHIV to enter, particularly on a long-term or permanent basis, imposes significant economic costs on the domestic health system. Whilst these framings have provided the rhetorical justification for HIV-related travel restrictions in virtually all cases, there have often been suspicions that other concerns, not least homophobia and other prejudices, have been an important (although usually unspoken) factor motivating proponents of restrictions.
The opposing side in the debate has sought both to counter these economic and health security arguments directly and also to link the travel restrictions issue to broader concerns about human rights and stigmatisation. In attempting to 're-frame' the issue of travel restrictions in rights terms, advocates have utilised a wide variety of techniques including the use of individual testimony to dramatise the issue and demonstrate the human costs of travel restrictions; moral shaming, linking the imposition of restrictions by governments with prejudice and discrimination; and legal argument, claiming that such restrictions are incompatible with international human rights law. A wide range of actors, especially drawn from civil society and the UN system, have consistently sought to forward such arguments over the last 25 years in an attempt to delegitimize HIV-related travel restrictions. Indeed in many ways the global debate has been a static one, with opponents of restrictions consistently forwarding these same arguments, but until recently to little effect. These advocates have done precisely the things which scholars who have examined the use of framing as an advocacy tool would suggest: they have credibly re-framed the issue in terms of human rights -a frame which is widely seen as legitimate within international society and which 'resonates' with a range of audiences -and have made use of exactly the kinds of advocacy techniques which have proven effective in other cases. Why, then, did the breakthrough take so long? And why now?
Framing has been widely discussed as a tool which enables advocates to apply pressure on governments for policy change. As is discussed elsewhere in this issue, frames are often described as linguistic, cognitive and symbolic devices used to identify, label, describe and interpret problems and to suggest particular ways of responding to them. In policy debates actors often deliberately (and in many cases strategically) use frames as a tool of persuasion, deploying them to call attention to an issue, influence other actors' perceptions of their own interests, and convince them of the legitimacy/appropriateness of the advocate's preferred policy response. When they are successful in doing so, the chosen frame 'resonates with public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues' and actors will be likely to modify their behaviour accordingly (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 897) . The social constructivist literature has examined a wide range of cases in which framing has been a successful advocacy strategy, often involving sophisticated and influential transnational advocacy networks (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998) .
In recent years a number of scholars in global health have examined the ways in which different framings of health issues have impacted on policy debates at both the global level (e.g. Shiffman and Smith 2007, Rushton 2010 ) and the national level (e.g. Labonté and Gagnon 2010). Building on social constructivist work, what they have found is that the ways in which health issues are framed can have a significant impact upon prioritisations and policy outcomes. A wide variety of factors have been identified as determining the success or failure of a particular framing including who is doing the framing, the nature of the audience they are trying to persuade, the extent to which the frame resonates with other deeply-embedded ideas, the intrinsic credibility of the frame; and the prevailing political context (e.g. Shiffman and Smith 2007, p. 1370) .
Both the literature on framing in global health, and the wider social constructivist literature within which it is rooted, has tended to examine successful examples of framing.
Whilst it is certainly not my intention to argue here that framing does not matter, this paper uses the global campaign against travel restrictions to highlight some of its limitations. In particular the paper examines the effectiveness of reframing an issue as a strategy for policy entrepreneurs, and the extent to which the successful use of framing to advocate for policy change is dependent upon a receptive audience and a conducive political environment. It is argued here that framing a global health issue in particular ways, alongside other advocacy strategies such as coalition-building and moral shaming, can be effective. However, as we see in the travel restrictions case, framing alone is not always enough to persuade states to change their policies, even where those frames seem to be convincing, appear to resonate with widely-recognised norms, and are supported over a significant period of time by a wide constellation of actors. Crucially, however, this does not mean that the years spent unsuccessfully forwarding human rights arguments against travel restrictions were wasted.
As agents and structures are mutually constitutive, framing, even when it does not immediately precipitate policy change, can itself play a part in gradually changing the political environment and in creating a more receptive audience. In this case the enormous efforts which AIDS activists went to in establishing human rights as being fundamental to the global response to AIDS was an important foundation on which the campaign against travel restrictions was able to build.
The paper begins by examining the campaign against HIV-related travel restrictions, arguing that that campaign has been remarkably consistent in its arguments over time and that re-framing travel restrictions as a violation of human rights has been central to this effort. The paper then moves on to put forward some possible explanations for the high-profile recent examples of policy change, in the process seeking to shed light on a number of political and contextual factors which, alongside framing, seem to have played a crucial role in bringing about policy change. The paper concludes with a discussion of the light which this case can shed on the use of framing in global health debates, in particular on the relationship between framers, their audience, and the political context within which they operate.
The global debate on HIV-related travel restrictions
The imposition of HIV-related travel restrictions has usually been justified by governments (and, much less frequently, by scholars (e.g. Nelson, 1987) ) on two principle grounds. The first is protecting the public against the supposed threat posed by HIV+ visitors and/or immigrants. The second is an economic argument: that the long-term costs of providing the necessary treatment and care for PLWHIV is a burden upon the state's resources, and as such grounds on which to deny entry. Here I examine the arguments which have been put forward by those opposing travel restrictions and trace the remarkable consistency in the arguments and frames they have deployed, with the essential contours of the debate having remained more or less unaltered since the mid-1980s.
The WHO made a strong case against the imposition of HIV-related travel restrictions from a very early stage in the development of the epidemic. As early as 1985, the year in which a reliable HIV test first became available, a meeting of Directors of WHO Collaborating Centers discussed the issue after member states had sought the WHO's advice.
The meeting concluded that testing and certification of international travellers was not warranted. As that meeting was reported in the Weekly Epidemiological Record, that advice appeared to be on the basis of two findings: that testing and certification were not warranted on public health grounds; and that they were not required under the International Health Regulations (WHO 1986) .
From that point onwards, the fact that there is little evidence to support the claim that travel restrictions serve a useful public health purpose has been one of the main arguments Indeed the argument has often gone beyond the claim that travel restrictions are ineffective to add that they may actually be counterproductive in public health terms, creating a false sense of security (e.g. Ganczak et al. 2007 ) and dissuading would-be immigrants from undergoing testing and seeking treatment (e.g. John Bradshaw, cited in Bristol 2009). Here a link has often been made between public health efficacy and respect for rights. This argument has been reflected in many of the UN System's engagements with the travel restrictions issue.
Jonathan Mann, who as head of the WHO's Global Programme on AIDS was a prominent and passionate advocate of the human rights dimensions of the pandemic, laid out the case at an early stage, arguing in an address in June 1988 that travel restrictions lead to stigmatization and discrimination which in turn threaten public health as 'those who are concerned they might be infected will take steps to avoid detection and will avoid contact with health and social services' (Mann 1988, pp. 9-10) . The evidence-base to support the claim that travel restrictions can have a negative health impact has gradually increased over time. One of the most commonly-cited examples is a 2006 survey of 1100 PLWHIV who travelled to the USA (which, at the time, did not allow HIV+ individuals to enter without applying for a waiver) (Mahto et al. 2006) . The study found that a majority in practice travelled to the USA illegally (i.e. without a waiver and without declaring their HIV serostatus) and that, fearing that the discovery of ARV medication in their luggage would lead to them being denied entry, a significant minority stopped their treatment for the duration of their visit. Ironically, given the fact that protecting public health was used to justify restrictions, Mahto et al. (2006, p. 204 ) note that such unplanned interruptions to treatment pose a public health risk through the potential development of drug resistance.
There has been similarly widespread scepticism about the argument that admitting PLWHIV puts a significant economic strain upon the national health system. This scepticism has only grown as the cost of antiretroviral therapies has plummeted over the last 15 years.
Here, however, the counter-argument has tended to be more nuanced. Rather than arguing that PLWHIV do not impose healthcare costs the argument has tended to be that this is not always the case, and therefore that blanket bans are inappropriate and that individual assessments are required (e.g. UNAIDS/IOM 2004, p. 9) . This has been supplemented by the arguments that in this respect HIV is no different to other causes of ill health, and therefore that regulations targeted specifically at HIV are not appropriate (e.g. Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos et al. 2008) , and that economic considerations should be outweighed by humanitarian factors, for example in asylum cases (UNAIDS 2006, para 128) . The WHO (e.g. WHO 1988) and others (e.g. UNAIDS/IOM 2004, p. 10) have long argued that the imposition of measures such as widespread HIV testing as part of immigration processes are disproportionately costly, particularly given the fact that PLWHIV are often (especially with the advent of more effective treatment regimens) able to make a significant economic contribution to a society for many years.
As well as addressing the public health and economic arguments on their own terms, the opponents of travel restrictions have also deliberately sought to re-frame the issue in human rights terms. Here I briefly outline four of the most common claims that have underpinned that framing. Often these arguments are supported by reference to international human rights laws and norms. Clearly all of these arguments are linked, and they are frequently deployed together. First, the principle of freedom of movement is widely cited, (Hendricks 1990, p. 196) , those restrictions have been remarkably persistent.
The majority of states which have had such measures put them in place in the 1980s when far less was known about HIV and the global pandemic was less advanced.
Nevertheless, it is striking that the real boom in the imposition of such restrictions came after the WHO's clear advice to the contrary. The academic literature of the late 1980s and early 1990s pointed to an increasing prevalence of restrictions (e.g. Duckett and Orkin, 1989 , Closen and Wojcik 1990 , Hendricks 1990 , with Nelson (1987, p. 232) arguing that a new international norm concerning the imposition of restrictions on travellers was developing as more and more states imposed them. The form that those restrictions took varied widely, including, variously, self-declaration or proof of status followed by entry subject to restrictions, through to automatic exclusion and even deportation. A 1989 global survey found that 50 countries imposed some kind of restrictions and that 32 had actually refused entry and/or deported individuals on the basis of their HIV status (Duckett and Orkin 1989) .
The survey found that a further 11 countries were at that stage considering introducing restrictions. The authors concluded (Duckett and Orkin, 1989, p and are discussed in the next section of this paper. This provides a puzzle. Given the consistency of the arguments against travel restrictions over the years, and given that those arguments have been framed in ways which, prima facie, ought to be convincing, why is it only now that the tide has begun to turn? The remainder of this article addresses that puzzle, putting forward four possible explanations for the timing of recent policy changes, explanations which, it is argued, help shed some light more generally on the conditions under which framing can be a successful advocacy strategy.
A new wave of policy change
During 2010 China, the United States and South Korea, all introduced changes in travel restrictions (although in some cases they were the result of processes which started some years earlier). The US policy change, on which much of this section focuses, had a catalytic effect on other states, and may even represent a tipping point in the overall delegitimisation of travel restrictions. The US has been by far the most high-profile case of policy change in this area, a result of both its status as a global leader (including in the global response to AIDS) and also the ferocity of the domestic policy debate.
The US restrictions were originally introduced in 1987 and from that time onwards huge lobbying efforts were made by domestic opponents of the travel ban and a series of attempts were made to change the policy. In 1990 CDC recommended that HIV should be removed from the 'dangerous contagious disease' list, and indeed it was due to be removed in Here, then, we have three cases of the removal (or at least partial removal) of travel restrictions in a very short period of time, and in each case by relatively powerful states, all of which are G20 members. In this section I put forward a number of factors which can help to explain some of these changes. Consistently framing travel restrictions as a human rights issue, and the refutation of the economic and public health grounds for them, undoubtedly played a part but were not in themselves sufficient to bring about national policy changes.
Rather these cases seems to have come about as a result of a coming together of various factors, including gradual changes in ideas about legitimacy of discriminating against highrisk groups and the severity of the 'threat' posed by PLWHIV; the domestic political context within these states; the existence of opportunities to apply pressure on governments, Helen Frary, UNAIDS' Chief of Board and UN Relations, described the extent to which this was something to which Ban is personally committed:
It was a good example with South Korea because Ban ki Moon never knew that they had travel restrictions, and when he found out he personally lobbied the government in Seoul and got them to change it because he said "this is outrageous." But until he was Secretary General he had never knowingly met someone who was HIV positive and he was put in a room -we have an organisation called UNPlus for UN HIV positive staffand there was a meeting between him and them, and he still talks about it. And he was extremely emotional because he'd never met somebody. And as a result he lobbied Seoul and that's one more to cross off the list. (Frary 2010) Michel Sidibé, Executive Director of UNAIDS, has been similarly forthright on the issue and Indonesia, all of whom pointed to the US restrictions then in force as precedent and justification for their own regulations (1995, . This only heightened the extent to which achieving US policy change would be likely to ripple-out across the international community.
As Craig McClure, Executive Director of the IAS, said on the announcement of the US's intention to remove its restrictions: 'The U.S. always sets the tone. This is huge not only for the people who have not been able to enter the U.S., but finally these laws might be overturned throughout the world' (USA Today 2008). global leadership on HIV/AIDS' (Nieburg et al. 2007, p. 2) .
Conclusion: framing is not enough
It is too early to know how quickly and how far and how quickly the US's change of policy will ripple out to other countries. The early signs, however, seem promising given the almost simultaneous changes in China and South Korea. Namibia also removed its restrictions in 2010, whilst India and Ecuador 'issued clarifications to underline that they too no longer employ such restrictions' (UNAIDS 2010c). Advocates, including Ban Ki-moon, have been explicitly using the US's policy change as an example for other states to follow (UNAIDS 2009b) . The emergence of new international norms is often dependent upon a 'tipping point', following which a norm cascade is set in train, diffusing the new standard of appropriate behaviour through international society (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) . It is possible,
although not yet certain, that the change in US policy could be just such a tipping point.
It is argued here, however, that the travel restrictions case provides some interesting and more general lessons about the use of framing as a global health advocacy strategy.
Whilst much of the existing literature has highlighted the potential of framing to play a significant part in precipitating policy change, the travel restrictions case suggests that there are very real limitations on what framing can achieve in the absence of an enabling political environment.
On the one hand there are elements of the case examined here which support the kinds of strategies which the existing literature has viewed as being important: the need to build a broad-based advocacy network, for example (Keck and Sikkink 1998) , and the ability of (supposedly) apolitical heads of international organisations to utilise framing in order to promote normative change (Rushton 2008 ). Yet this is a case in which a virtually universal expert consensus against the public health security and economic framings was in place, and in which continuous attempts were made over decades to reframe the issue in human rights terms. Despite this, little progress was made until the political conditions (and in particular the domestic political conditions within the US) were right. Yet once those conditions were in place, in other words once the audience was susceptible to persuasion, the advocacy strategies used by opponents of restrictions began to bear fruit. Framing does not take place in a vacuum, and its chances of success are highly context-dependent.
Yet if, as constructivists argue, agents and structure are mutually constitutive (Wendt 1987) , is it impossible to entirely separate agents from the political context within which they operate. International politics is not a Habermasian 'ideal speech' situation, and the better argument does not always win out. But framing, even when it does not immediately bring about policy change, might nevertheless play a part in gradually changing the political environment. The continuing efforts of AIDS activists from the very earliest days of the epidemic -efforts which were much wider than but which included the travel restrictions issue -helped establish the case that respect for human rights must be a fundamental part of the response to AIDS. The establishment of this common sense was a vital foundation on which the campaign against travel restrictions was able to build.
